H.E. Adrian Zuckerman, the United States Ambassador to Romania from 2019 to 2021, has written an op-ed for DC News in which he states that Romania risks losing one of the most significant opportunities in the energy sector due to management decisions.
The Op-Ed by His Excellency Adrian Zuckerman, United States Ambassador to Romania from December 2019 to February 2021:
H.E. Adrian Zuckerman for DC News: Nuclearelectrica's management decisions may constitute a national security risk
In this day of extremely difficult economic conditions and high energy costs it is very frustrating to watch the Romanian government continue to allow mismanaged and opaque state owned entities dissipate Romania's assets. It is not just the billions of Euros that are squandered or pilfered, but the loss of many more billions that are not realized.
Of the 1,400 or so state owned entities few are well managed and few actually show a profit. In many cases this profit is illusory such as in the case of Trans-Electrica where approximately 80% of its infrastructure has not been modernized and dates back to communist days. Tarom and CFR have also been singled out as abject failures. However, seemingly no one has scrutinized Nuclearelectrica and its managent decisions. It is not just an issue of profitability, but may also pose a national security risk. It is truly remarkable that it has been allowed to manage, or mis-manage, Romania's nuclear projects for years on end.
At the end of 2020 Nuclear Electrica was poised to proceed with building two new nuclear reactors at Cernavoda, Units 3 and 4, and rehabilitating Unit 1. Plans and time schedules were created in 2020 whereby Unit 1 would have been closed for approximately one year and put back into service by 2026 and Units 3 and 4 would have been completed by 2028/2029. The total price was between $8 and $9billion. As part of the financing EXIM US would provide up to $7billion. Each one of the Cernavoda reactors would provide slightly more than 700MW for a total of a little more than 2800MW. This represents approximately 42 per cent of Romania's electrical consumption.
This did not happen. For reasons that are truly perplexing starting in 2021 continuing change requests to the projects started, contractors left because they were not paid and the project stalled. Nuclear Electrica started looking at a small modular reactor project at Doicesti, notwithstanding repeated warnings that it had neither the financing capacity nor the human capital to develop these projects at the same time.
The most stunning part about the small modular reactor project is that it currently has a price tag of $6 Billion dollars and if and when finished would produce only 450MW. This is less than even the coal powered plant previously on the same location that produced 600MW. Additionally, the construction cost per megawatt for the small modular reactor is approximately three times the cost for Cernavoda and the production cost per megawatt of power produced by the small modular reactor would have a cost that is almost double that of a megawatt produced at Cernavoda and perhaps as much as three or four times the cost of a megawatt produced by renewables, hydro or gas. The only way for this power to be sold commercially is for the Romanian government( the taxpayer) to subsidize the cost difference.
Notwithstanding any of this Nuclear Electrica poured hundreds of millions of dollars into this project at the Doicesti site. The financing parameters without state aid do not work and the location is not optimal.
The Doicești Small Modular Reactor (SMR) project is often cited as one of the most advanced SMR initiatives in Europe. Following a Final Investment Decision (FID) in February 2026, the project has formally entered the implementation phase. Yet beneath this progress lies a more complex reality: the project is not fully financeable, not execution-ready, and—perhaps most importantly—may not be optimally sited.
Despite the FID milestone, the Doicești project remains pre-execution in practical terms. Key pillars necessary for delivery—financing, contractual structure, and risk allocation—are still unresolved. There is no fully executed, bankable engineering, procurement, construction (EPC) contract, and the roles of key participants continue to evolve.
Financing remains the central constraint. The project is still dependent on external support, including engagement with U.S. government-backed institutions, and has yet to secure a complete and bankable funding package. Without this, transition to full construction remains uncertain.
On the technical side, the project is relatively robust. Front-end engineering and design (FEED) phases have been completed on schedule, the site has been validated under international standards, and the NuScale SMR technology is licensed and deployable.
However, technical readiness does not equate to commercial viability. The economic model suggests that SMRs in the European context require substantial support. With estimated levelized costs in the €90–140/MWh range, the project is unlikely to be viable on a purely merchant basis. A Contract for Difference (CfD) in the range of €100–130/MWh is likely necessary to attract financing and ensure bankability.
Doicești’s primary advantage lies in its status as a brownfield site, benefiting from existing infrastructure and prior coal plant usage. This has made it an attractive early candidate for SMR deployment.
Yet from a system-wide perspective, the site may not be ideally positioned. Romania’s highest and most stable electricity demand is concentrated around Bucharest and major industrial corridors such as Constanța, Ploiești, and the western regions. Doicești, while viable, is not optimally aligned with these demand centers.
Alternative locations closer to major load hubs could offer several advantages: reduced need for transmission upgrades; stronger industrial offtake potential and more bankable power purchase structures; improved grid integration and system efficiency. These factors are not merely technical—they directly affect project economics, financing, and long-term viability.
Romania’s broader nuclear program highlights a persistent execution challenge: the inability to deliver large-scale nuclear projects on a timely and predictable basis.
The development of Cernavodă Units 3 and 4 is emblematic. Originally initiated decades ago, the project has undergone repeated restructurings, partner withdrawals, and strategic resets. As of 2026, while intergovernmental cooperation and financing frameworks have been re-initiated, the project remains pre-construction, with no clear, time-bound path to execution. The repeated delays reflect not only financing complexity, but also institutional, contractual, and governance constraints that have prevented timely delivery.
In parallel, the refurbishment of Unit 1 at Cernavodă—a critical life-extension project necessary to maintain existing nuclear capacity—has similarly experienced extended timelines and evolving cost and execution frameworks. Although formally advancing, the project continues to face schedule uncertainty, financing dependencies, and execution risk, raising questions about the ability to complete the refurbishment within originally anticipated timelines. The required outage period further amplifies system risk if delays occur.
Taken together, these projects illustrate a broader pattern: repeated delays in advancing major nuclear investments from planning to execution; dependence on complex, state-backed financing structures that prolong timelines; limited track record of delivering large nuclear projects on schedule in the current institutional framework
This context is critical. It suggests that Romania’s nuclear expansion is not constrained by strategy or technology alone, but by execution capacity and delivery discipline.
As a result, SMRs—such as the Doicești project—are not just complementary additions, but are being positioned as more agile alternatives. However, if similar governance, financing, and execution challenges persist, there is a material risk that SMR deployment could follow the same pattern unless structural issues are addressed.
The project also faces softer, but consequential, risks. Public discourse has raised questions regarding procurement transparency, valuation of contributed assets, and the use of public funds. While no definitive findings have been established, such concerns can influence investor perception, increase due diligence burdens, and heighten regulatory scrutiny.
In parallel, governance structures within the project company remain a work in progress, with incomplete clarity around decision-making authority, oversight, and accountability.
The Doicești project is best understood as a pioneering but still fragile initiative—advanced in concept, yet not fully realized in execution. Its success will depend not only on resolving financing and contractual challenges, but also on confronting a more structural issue: whether the project is being developed at the right site to maximize its economic and strategic value.
As Romania moves forward with traditional nuclear power at Cernavoda and SMR deployment, reassessing project execution—while accounting for broader nuclear program constraints—may prove as important, if not more important, than the technology itself. This can not be achieved in the absence of good and transparent management. Right now Romania has two major nuclear projects with no realistic completion dates and no clear path to get there - it does not need to be this way.
The primary focus should be on finishing the Cernavoda project and then reexamining in a dispassionate transparent fashion the need for an SMR and if so, where it should be best located.